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South African universities and other institutions of higher education currently give 
preference to student applicants from designated ‘races’. This paper argues that such a 
policy is morally indefensible. Although the imperative to redress injustice is endorsed, 
this, it is argued, does not entail that applicants may be favoured on the basis of their 
(purported) ‘race’. Nor can the pursuit of diversity be used to defend racial preference. 
Next, it is argued that any policy on racial preference must have both a racial taxonomy 
and a method of assigning individuals to different taxonomic categories. It is argued 
that both competing methods of categorizing individuals – one subjective and the 
other objective – are unacceptable. Finally, the paper highlights a number of fallacious 
responses to criticisms of racial preference. 
Discussions on affirmative action become emotional very rapidly. This is entirely 
understandable. In places such as South Africa, where a long history of racial 
oppression has left many with deep scars, there is both anger about the damage 
and impatience to reverse it. Although these emotions are warranted, they can 
be impediments to determining whether or not affirmative action is a morally 
appropriate policy. Just as we insist that convicting people accused of crimes, and 
then sentencing them should be done by dispassionate tribunals, so we should insist 
that responses to racial injustice be evaluated in a dispassionate way. This is the most 
reliable way of ensuring that we do what is best rather than what feels best. 
Affirmative action need not involve racial preference. Affirmative action 
programmes could consist in removing various obstacles to true equality of 
opportunity – including financial ones – without favouring people on the basis of 
their purported ‘race’. However, such affirmative action programmes are not morally 
controversial. Instead, the concerns arise when some people are favoured on the 
basis of their belonging to a particular racial group. It is thus, this form of affirmative 
action that I shall discuss. My focus will be on admissions rather than appointments 
– that is, on student applicants rather than staff applicants.1 
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THE RECTIFICATION ARGUMENT
Proponents of (racial preference) affirmative action in university and other higher 
education admissions policies often reason as follows:
1. Disproportionately few students at South African institutions of higher 
education are ‘Black’. 
2. This is because of South Africa’s legacy of racial injustice. 
3. We must redress injustice.
4. The only way this can be done is by favouring ‘Blacks’. 
5. Therefore, racial preference admissions policies are not only warranted but 
also required. 
Although this argument, which I shall call the rectification argument, has widespread 
appeal, it is fallacious. It is important, however, to identify just where the flaws 
occur. Some proponents of the argument mistakenly think that all those who reject it 
deny one or more of the first three premises. 
The first premise is obviously true. ‘Blacks’ are indeed a much smaller proportion 
of the overall South African student body than they are of the overall South African 
population. Some proponents of affirmative action belabour the figures. They seem 
to think that if only they could convince their opponents of these statistics, opponents 
of affirmative action would be forced to embrace the conclusion. However, here they 
ignore the fact that the first premise, true though it is, does not by itself entail the 
conclusion. 
The second premise – that South Africa’s legacy of racial injustice is what explains 
why there are disproportionately few ‘Black’ students at South African institutions 
of higher education – is ambiguous. Under one interpretation it too is obviously true. 
Had ‘Blacks’ not been denied the social, economic and educational benefits afforded 
to ‘Whites’, the student population would have been much more reflective of the 
country’s population. It is also true that disadvantage along racial lines did not end 
with apartheid. This is because the relevant disadvantages are not easily overcome. 
Impoverished people with little or no access to adequate education do not suddenly 
overcome these disadvantages as soon as formal obstacles to equality are removed. 
The second premise becomes contentious if one understands it to mean that the 
relevant legacy is current prejudice against ‘Blacks’. On this view, ‘Blacks’ are 
being barred (or excluded) from tertiary educational institutions not because of their 
educational or financial disadvantage but because ‘Whites’ are blocking them. In 
saying that this is false, I do not mean to deny that racism still exists. Racial prejudice 
did not evaporate in 1994. However, the reason that disproportionately few ‘Black’ 
students are being admitted is not because those making admissions decisions 
are racist. If it were because they were racist, the solution would be to employ an 
admissions system in which applicants would be given application numbers, and 
admission decisions would be made on the basis of matriculation marks linked to that 
number rather than to a name or other identifying information that could reveal an 
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applicant’s ‘race’. However, we all know that disproportionately few ‘Blacks’ would 
be admitted under such a system. This is because it is the first interpretation of the 
second premise that is the correct one: that historical discrimination against ‘Blacks’ 
has led to disproportionately few ‘Blacks’ having attained the levels required for 
success at university.
Turning to the third premise – that we must redress injustice – it is noteworthy 
that some defenders of affirmative action uncharitably characterise their opponents 
as rejecting this premise. For this reason, it should be emphasized that the third 
premise is not in dispute. Both opponents and proponents of affirmative action can 
agree on the need for rectifying injustice. Where they disagree is on how this should 
be done. More specifically, they disagree on whether favouring people on the basis 
of their ‘race’ is the right way to rectify injustice. In other words, they disagree about 
the fourth premise – the claim that the only way to redress injustice is by favouring 
‘Blacks’. Opponents of the rectification argument reject the fourth premise, while 
defenders of the argument obviously accept it. 
There are a number of points to make in connection with the fourth premise. The 
first of these is that not every injustice can be rectified. The paradigmatic example 
is murder. One can never undo an unjust killing and one can never compensate the 
victim. Of those injustices that can be rectified, even if only partially, very few 
can be rectified by means of university admissions, or at the university level more 
generally. For example, those who, as a result of injustice, are so undereducated that 
they could never succeed at university, even with appropriate support, cannot be 
compensated by admittance to a university. Indeed, admitting them may compound 
injustice by unreasonably raising expectations and setting people up for failure. The 
injustices suffered by such people must be compensated in other ways. Moreover, 
to prevent new generations also suffering such injustices, ‘upstream’ interventions, 
most obviously the provision of decent primary and second education, are required. 
Such attempts at redress are the responsibility of government rather than of 
universities (even though universities have responsibilities to assist government by, 
for example, training teachers). University admission policies can help rectify past 
injustice only in those cases where the applicants, although disadvantaged, have 
not been so badly disadvantaged as to have no reasonable chance of succeeding if 
admitted. 
What is crucial at this juncture, however, is to realize that if one is trying to favour 
the moderately disadvantaged, then the relevant focus of one’s affirmative action 
policy should be ‘moderate disadvantage’ rather than ‘race’. The obvious and very 
common response here is to note the high correlation between disadvantage and 
(‘Black’) ‘race’. The overwhelming majority of disadvantaged people (including 
the moderately disadvantaged) are ‘Black’. Although that is true, ‘race’ remains a 
proxy for the relevant consideration – ‘moderate disadvantage’. One of the problems 
with using the proxy is that it is less accurate than using that criterion for which it 
is a proxy. Instead of thinking about whether a given ‘Black’ is disadvantaged, one 
focuses only on the fact that he is ‘Black’. 
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Some wish to argue that being ‘Black’ is in itself a disadvantage and not simply 
a proxy for disadvantage. According to this argument stereotypes of ‘Blacks’ as 
intellectually inferior become internalized and lead to lower levels of academic 
performance. I do not deny that such stereotypes exist. Nor do I deny that they 
can be damaging to those who are stereotyped – however, I deny that these facts 
do the argumentative work they are alleged to do. First, there are clearly some 
‘Blacks’ who have not internalized such stereotypes. Like many ‘Whites’, they 
were appropriately nurtured by parents and good teachers, and they do well 
academically. As a result, they lack academic insecurities. It is simply incredible 
to think that all ‘Blacks’, especially in a post-Apartheid society, have this degree 
of insecurity. (If it were true, there would not be the clamour there is for academic 
advancement and development.) Second, those ‘Black’ children who do grow up 
thinking that they are not any good academically are not unlike some ‘White’ 
children who, for reasons other than racial stereotypes, might be led to the same 
belief about themselves. (Consider, for example, children who are dyslexic, or who 
suffer psychological abuse at the hands of cruel parents or teachers.) The proportion 
of ‘Whites’ suffering such insecurities may well be much lower than the proportion 
of ‘Blacks’, but it is simply not the case that all ‘Blacks’ and no ‘Whites’ fall into 
this category. Of course, those making admissions decisions are often unable to 
determine the presence and extent of such disadvantages, but it remains true that it 
is disadvantage rather than ‘race’ that is relevant. 
Some defenders of ‘race’-based affirmative action suspect that a focus on 
disadvantage rather than on ‘race’ will lead to even fewer ‘Blacks’ being admitted 
to universities. However, this is false. If appropriate measures of moderate 
disadvantage are used, we can expect, given the history and demographics of 
South Africa, that the overwhelming majority (but not all) of those favoured 
will be ‘Black’. Thus, instead of substantially altering the number of ‘Blacks’ 
who will be admitted to university, an affirmative action policy that favoured the 
moderately disadvantaged would primarily influence which ‘Blacks’ are favoured. 
To understand the significance of this, it is important to note that at any given time, 
the number of places in a university is limited. Applicants, including those who will 
be admitted to a particular programme of study only if they are favoured in some 
way, are competing for these limited places. If the policy is to favour moderately 
disadvantaged students, then all the applicants who are admitted and who would 
not otherwise have been admitted, will be moderately disadvantaged. Almost all 
will be ‘Black’, but a few might be ‘White’. By contrast, if the policy is to favour 
‘Blacks’ then only some of those who would have been admitted under a policy 
favouring the moderately disadvantaged will be admitted, while the remaining 
places will go to ‘Blacks’ who are not disadvantaged (but whose grades are just 
below the threshold for the same reasons that some ‘White’ applicants’ marks are 
below the threshold for acceptance). Defenders of racial preference affirmative 
action who say that they are interested in rectifying injustice need to explain why 
they prefer favouring advantaged ‘Blacks’ over moderately disadvantaged ones. 
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At this point, some might wish to defend the fourth premise by clarifying it. 
It might be suggested that while it is in principle possible to redress injustice by 
favouring the moderately disadvantaged, in practice a ‘race’-based policy is the only 
way to alter the racial proportions. According to this argument, we simply do not 
have a reliable mechanism for determining who is moderately disadvantaged. Thus, 
there is ‘no alternative’ to the use of ‘race’ at the moment. This is not credible. It 
suggests either a lack or will or of imagination. The real test of whether there is 
an alternative would be to outlaw racial preferences. I suspect that very soon we 
would see in action the old adage that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’. This is 
exactly what happened with the South African National Blood Services, which had 
maintained that there was no alternative to the use of ‘race’ as one proxy for HIV-
tainted blood. Following governmental outrage in the wake of the exposure of this 
policy, alternatives were soon found (Bateman 2005). 
In the case of university admissions one way of determining disadvantage would 
be to require somewhat lower scores from students at schools that are deemed to be 
disadvantaged. Such a policy might take into account the length of time an applicant 
spent at a given school, so as not to disadvantage students who for their final year 
or two managed to shift from a more to a less disadvantaged school, giving them 
insufficient opportunity to reap the full benefit of the better school. 
In response to such a proposal, it is sometimes suggested that ‘Blacks’ in 
advantaged schools do worse than ‘Whites’ in the same schools, given other ways in 
which they are disadvantaged. This is not a good reason to prefer a racial preference 
affirmative action policy. First, if it is true that ‘Blacks’ in advantaged schools do 
not do as well as their ‘White’ peers, it is presumably true on average. Surely some 
‘Blacks’ do as well as their ‘White’ classmates. There is no reason why those ‘Blacks’ 
should be favoured in admissions. Second, of those ‘Blacks’ who do not meet the 
‘White’ average, some will not do so for the same reasons that some ‘Whites’ do not. 
That is to say, it will not be a lack of advantage, but some other deficiency. There is 
no reason why those ‘Blacks’ should be favoured either. Third, there may be some 
‘Blacks’ in advantaged schools who, because of other disadvantages, do not do as 
well as ‘White’ students, but there are at least two things to say here. First, the school 
criterion could be coupled with other criteria, such as parental occupation or parental 
income. Second, any affirmative action policy has to choose whom to favour. And 
the choice here is whether the policy should favour those disadvantaged ‘Blacks’ 
who at least had some advantages, or whether it should favour those disadvantaged 
school pupils who lacked even those advantages. If one is interested in redressing 
disadvantage, one should favour the latter. 
THE DIVERSITY ARGUMENT
Not all defenders of racial affirmative action justify it on the basis of redress. The major 
alternative is to appeal to the (purported) benefits of diversity. This justification, which 
we might call the diversity argument, is moot in the context of admissions (unlike 
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in the case of appointments) if, as I have suggested, employing a more direct test of 
disadvantage would not significantly diminish the number of ‘Blacks’ admitted, when 
compared with the number of ‘Black’ admissions under a system of racial affirmative 
action. Racial diversity would be advanced under both systems. 
However, because I think that a principled shift away from racial preference 
affirmative action is better than a shift that is the consequence of a begrudging 
recognition that racial diversity will not be impacted, a few brief observations about 
diversity are in order. The aim here is to gesture at why racial preference admissions 
should be abandoned even if, contrary to fact, doing so would impact negatively on 
the racial diversity of the student body. I say ‘gesture’, because there is insufficient 
space here to provide a full refutation of the diversity argument for racial preference 
affirmative action.2 
First, we need to be clear about what the relevant diversity is. If diversity itself 
were valuable, then we would need to pursue a more diverse diversity (including 
religions, ages, national origin, and so forth). Instead, defenders of affirmative action 
typically think that only some kinds of diversity should be pursued – most obviously 
racial and gender diversity, but sometimes also a kind of diversity that would increase 
the number of disabled students. I shall focus here on racial diversity because it is 
most germane in South Africa. 
This brings us to a second point. Because it is very difficult to explain why 
racial diversity itself is important, defenders of racial preference affirmative action 
typically argue that racial diversity is important because it will advance some other 
valuable goals. For example, it is sometimes argued that racial diversity advances 
diversity of opinion, which in turn furthers the pursuit of truth, a central project of 
any university. The problem with this sort of argument, however, is that if one is 
interested in diversity of opinion, one would be better advised not to use race as a 
proxy, but to aim directly at diversity of opinion. I am not recommending opinion 
tests for admission to universities (any more than I am recommending ‘race’ tests), 
but merely pointing out the logical implications of the argument at hand. 
Others claim that racial diversity improves the quality of the learning experience. 
The problem here, however, is that the studies that purportedly show this, suffer from 
various methodological flaws. For example, by asking subjects both how diverse their 
institutions are and how good the education is, they tell more about what the subjects 
think the correlation of their answers should be than what the actual correlation is. 
One study that controlled for this confounding variable found that diversity does not 
improve university education (Rothman, Lipset and Nevitte 2003). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that ‘diversity’ is not the same as ‘proportionality’. 
The former term, common in arguments for affirmative action in the United States, 
where ‘Blacks’ are a minority, has been imported to South Africa without recognizing 
that even if the diversity argument did work, it would yield only the conclusion that 
there should be some ‘Black’ students. It would not yield the conclusion that the 
number of ‘Black’ students should be proportionate to the number of ‘Blacks’ in the 
South African population. 
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THE ABSURDITY OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATION
Defences of racial preference affirmative action ignore the elephant in the room. 
The elephant in question is not a ‘white elephant’ but instead the more common, 
grey kind: not everybody is either ‘Black’ or ‘White’ (even if we use ‘Black’ in its 
broader sense to include anybody who is not ‘White’). Less cryptically, the problem 
is as follows: Any policy that aims to favour some people on the basis of their ‘race’ 
must not only have a racial taxonomy, but also a mechanism of assigning individuals 
to one of the taxonomic categories. Both of these are riddled with absurdities. 
Any racial taxonomy is bizarre. South Africa’s racial categories are ‘African’, 
‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘White’. Sometimes ‘Black’ is used synonymously with 
‘African’ and sometimes it is used as a more inclusive category that also spans 
‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’, an ambiguity which is often exploited. People who use 
these terms (without the scare quotes) rarely stop to think just how idiosyncratic (and 
idiotic) these categories are. Elsewhere, for example, anybody called either ‘African’ 
or ‘Coloured’ in South Africa would be called ‘Coloured’ or ‘Black’ or ‘African-
American’ in other places or at other times in those other places. That should give 
pause to those who think that any of these categories are ‘obvious’. 
However, if we set aside that problem for the moment, we immediately confront 
another and arguably more difficult one – namely, how to assign individuals to 
particular racial categories. There are two broad options – self-categorization and 
categorization according to some standard independent of the views of the person 
being categorized. 
During the apartheid era, the latter method was employed and was rightly 
ridiculed. Bizarre ‘pencil tests’ and other absurd methods of determining people’s 
‘race’ were employed. It is understandable that post-apartheid South Africa has 
shied away from such outrageous and demeaning methods of forcibly categorizing 
people, often against their will. Or so it seems. Nominally, South Africans are now 
free to classify themselves, but the understanding is that most of them will classify 
themselves in the way that they would have been classified by the apartheid regime. 
If that were not the case, and self-assignment were really the criterion, then it would 
be impossible for people to mis-categorize themselves. Any pale skin South African 
classifying himself as ‘Black’ would be ‘Black’. In other words, if self-categorization 
is the criterion then anybody wanting to benefit from racial affirmative action need 
only classify himself as a member of the racial group that is favoured. Because this 
would not be tolerated, at least on a wide scale, we can see that there is, in fact, a 
surreptitious appeal to some more objective standard. 
The problem, however, is that any such standard is both abhorrent and absurd. 
Confident classifiers might be happy to assign to racial categories people who they 
take to be ‘obviously’ either ‘Black’ or ‘White’, but even the classifiers should worry 
about the thousands of people in the racial spectrum who are racially ambiguous. 
Consider, for example, the child of a ‘White’ South African? By the standards of 
racial preference affirmative action, such a person is privileged. But what if the 
‘White’ South African’s wife – the child’s mother – is a ‘Black’ Zimbabwean? Let’s 
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imagine further that the child was reared abroad (because of the illegality of his 
parents’ relationship under the apartheid legislation), where he was schooled at good 
institutions. Is he ‘coloured’ because he has one ‘Black’ parent and one ‘White’ 
parent? What if he rejects that classification and prefers to be called an ‘African’? 
By apartheid-style categorizations, he would be ineligible for this categorization. If 
we defer to his self-classification, then we have abandoned a purportedly objective 
classification in favour of his self-identification, which opens the way for others to 
classify themselves as they see fit. In any event, it seems absurd, irrespective of how 
he is classified, that he be eligible for racial preference given the absence of any 
relevant disadvantage. 
Consider, next, the case of North Africans. Are they ‘Africans’? How could 
a North African not be an ‘African’? But if they are ‘Africans’, what about non-
African Arabs? How are we then to classify Turks and Iranians? How are Berbers 
to be classified? Are they ‘African’ because they are North African, or are at least 
some of them not ‘African’ on account of their partial resemblance to Europeans? 
Could it really make sense to determine whether a Berber is ‘African’ or not on the 
basis of his eye colour? Those who answer affirmatively must then explain whether 
two (genetic) siblings in any country could be of different races because they have 
different eye or skin colour. 
These are just a few of the absurdities of race classification. The problem for 
the racial classifier is that if we were to line up all humans in order of skin colour, 
or hair texture, or facial appearance or whatever else is deemed relevant by the 
‘race’ classifier, we would find a smooth and seamless continuity across these 
various spectra. We would not find the sort of discontinuities that enable confident 
classification of all people into distinct races. 
Some defenders of racial affirmative action have responded to such challenges by 
denying that they are employing a biological notion of ‘race’. Instead, they claim, 
they are using either a political notion, or a more complex cluster notion embodying 
many factors (Hall 2007). There are serious problems with this move. First, insofar as 
‘race’ is being used in a sense that departs from the way it was used by the apartheid 
regime, the case for ‘race’ being a marker of who has been disadvantaged is weakened. 
People were discriminated against on the basis of purported biological categories. 
To then favouring people on the basis of some other, even if allied category, is to 
move further away from the rectification rationale (Benatar 2007). Second, even if 
one rejects this first point, it is simply not credible that South African universities are 
using, or could use ‘race’ in the purported complex senses. Those making admissions 
decisions simply do not know enough about applicants to determine what their ‘race’ 
is, if it is as complex a notion as some people claim (Benatar 2007). 
No system of racial preference can work without some mechanism for assigning 
people to various racial groups. No legislation or regulations in South Africa make 
it clear how people are to be assigned. The expectation is that individuals will do the 
state’s dirty work by classifying themselves in roughly the way the Apartheid regime 
did or (in the case of younger people and more recent immigrants) would have. In 
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other words, the current racial preference legislation expects individuals to do what 
the state refuses to do explicitly – namely, to classify them racially. 
Because assigning individuals to racial categories is a sine qua non of any 
system of racial preference, defenders of such a system must determine how such 
assignments are to be made. If the criterion is self-assessment, then there can be no 
second-guessing anybody’s self-classification: You are what you say you are. This 
implies that you are to be favoured by a policy of racial preference if and only if 
you say so (by saying you belong to the favoured ‘race’). That is unacceptable. The 
alternative is that people are classified in terms of some purportedly objective criteria, 
but this involves not only the absurdities I have described but also the indignities of 
involuntarily being classified. This too is unacceptable. 
HOW NOT TO DEFEND ‘RACE’-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The arguments against ‘race’-based affirmative action are extremely compelling. 
Those committed to racial preference resort to any number of unsatisfactory 
responses to such arguments. Arguably, the crudest response, but also a very 
common one, is to resort to ad hominem attacks on critics of affirmative action, 
implying that they are either, at the very least insensitive or, at worst, racist. Other 
defenders of affirmative action keep repeating their assumptions – for example, that 
racial preference is essential to redress – without engaging with the arguments that 
question these assumptions. Another common move is to claim that arguments of 
the sort I have provided are ‘decontextualized’ (Hall 2007). Often the context that 
is purportedly ignored is not specified, but even when the context is said to be the 
long history of racial discrimination, it is usually not said how that undermines the 
argument against affirmative action. Indeed, given that arguments such as those I 
have advanced explicitly recognize the legacy of racism, it is very difficult to see 
how the arguments are thought to ignore the context. Thus, one way of advancing 
the claim that opponents of affirmative action ignore the context is by misconstruing 
these arguments. Thus, arguments against affirmative action are sometimes 
mischaracterized as arguments against the importance of redress, even though the 
real disagreement is about whether affirmative action is an appropriate method of 
redress.
The final refuge of those desperate to ward off arguments against affirmative 
action is to undermine the enterprise of logical reasoning itself. They eschew ‘fixed 
sequential logic with irrefutable outcomes at each of its stages’ and prefer to be free 
‘from the shackles’ of an ‘analytical prison’ (Hall 2007). They sometimes question 
whether there is any such thing as truth anyway. What these people fail to realise is 
that in abandoning a rational enterprise, their own arguments become pointless. If our 
reasoning need not be constrained by logical principles, then we have an intellectual 
free-for-all, in which no argument for any view can be better or worse than any 
other. If there is no truth, then their own views about affirmative action are not true 
either. There is then simply no reason for us to pay the least bit of attention to them. 
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If, by contrast, defenders of racial affirmative action think that their arguments are 
worthy of consideration, they have to be willing to have their arguments rationally 
evaluated. When that happens, I have argued, these arguments are found wanting. 
NOTES
1 Although preference on the basis of a person’s sex is also controversial, I shall restrict 
my attention to racial preference because I take the case for sex-based affirmative 
action to be even weaker than the case for ‘race’-based affirmative action. Moreover, 
in the case of admissions (unlike appointments) applicants are currently favoured on 
the basis of ‘race’ rather than sex.
2 I examine this and other arguments at much greater length in (Benatar, 2008).
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